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Abstract 
We examine the effects of public research and development (R&D) subsidies and the 
governance of such subsidies on the productivity of firms. Bases on the analysis of a firm-level 
panel dataset between 1998 and 2007 in China, we find that public R&D subsidies tend to 
support more productive firms, and the productivity of these government-backed firms 
improves further after they get the government support. Less attention is paid to the observable 
or measurable performance measurements in ex-ante project selection and the ex-post effects 
are stronger when the governance of the public R&D subsidies becomes more decentralized 
due to an exogenous policy change. The better the governance decentralization is implemented, 
the stronger the effects of public R&D subsidies are observed. Identification concerns are 
addressed with various approaches to confirm the treatment effect of public R&D subsidies and 
the governance of such subsidies.  
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In this study, we examine the effects of public research and development (R&D) subsidies 
and how the governance of such subsidies influences those effects. Corporate R&D activities 
may be underinvested in a free market because the social returns of R&D activities are larger 
than their private returns (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). Therefore, government engagement is 
called for as a mechanism to respond to such market failures (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992). This proposed solution is based on the assumption that the government is capable of 
choosing a project that generates high social returns and would not have been undertaken by for-
profit firms otherwise. However, scholars have been discussing the inefficiencies and various 
distortions that government interventions may cause (Stigler, 1971; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; 
Acemoglu et al., 2013). It  therefore calls for solid examinations on the effects of public R&D 
subsidies.  
Empirical evidence on the effects of public R&D support is numerous. Yet, the results 
remain inconclusive. Some studies find that public R&D support has positive effects on firm 
performance and R&D intensity (Griliches and Regev, 1998; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998; 
Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hsu, et al, 2009; Ratinho and Henriques, 2010; Czarnitzki and Lopes- 
Bento, 2011; Doh and Kim, 2014; Radas et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2017). Meanwhile, some 
studies find that the positive effects of government support depend on the predefined evaluation 
criteria of public R&D support (Hsu et al., 2009), the size (Lööf and Hesmati, 2005) or 
technology of the firm (Clausen, 2009; Lee, 2011), or, the market conditions under which such 
programs operate (Sternberg, 2014; Guo et al., 2017). However, other studies find that public 
R&D support has done nothing to stimulate firm performance (Klette and Møen, 1999; Guan and 




R&D inputs, thereby reducing social welfare and growth (Wallsten, 2000; Hussinger, 2008; 
Acemoglu et al., 2013; Hong et al., 2016). 
These studies have significantly improved our understanding of public R&D programs, but 
several knowledge gaps are left to be filled. First, despite the wide recognition of the important 
role governments play in public R&D programs, little is known about how such programs are 
governed and how the governance influences the effects of such programs. To what extent the 
government may solve market failures in corporate R&D investment relies on the capability and 
incentives of government agencies, which in turn are determined by the governance of such 
agencies. Therefore, the exploration of the governance of public R&D programs is important for 
us to gain insights into the circumstances under which government engagement in corporate 
R&D activities may solves market failures. Particularly, the different governance of public R&D 
programs across countries may result in contradicting findings in the existing studies. Second, 
existing studies mainly focus on public R&D programs in market-centered economies, where 
governments seldom intervene markets and are assumed to be relatively efficient. The study on 
the effectiveness of public support to corporate R&D in countries where governments are deeply 
engaged in business activities remains limited. Third, the endogeneity issue attributed to 
selection biases in public R&D programs and omitted variables has been a major challenge and 
may contribute to the mixed findings in existing studies (David et al., 2000). 
This study attempts to address the omission in the literature by examining the effects of 
public R&D subsidies in China and the governance of such subsidies. The Chinese government 
has recognized the importance of promoting corporate innovation and has invested substantial 
efforts on this endeavor (Sun et al., 2013). Yet, systematic analysis on public R&D support in 




based on listed firms, which are typically large and have access to other external financial 
resources (e.g., Fan, 2006; Boeing, 2016; Boeing et al., 2016). Guo et al. (2016, 2017), Guan and 
Yam (2015), and Furman et al. (2017) are among the few studies that examine public R&D 
support to small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. However, these studies do not 
provide sufficient insights into the governance of such public programs or the consequent effects 
of the governance. Therefore, the present study not only provides new insights into public R&D 
programs in China, but also offers implications on whether market failures in corporate R&D 
investments of SMEs are mitigated by government-sponsored R&D programs under a regime, 
which differs from a typical market economy. 
Specifically, we utilize the data of the Innovation Fund for Small and Medium 
Technology-based Firms (Innofund) and a firm-level panel dataset, i.e., the Above-Scale 
Industrial Firms Panel 1998–2007 (ASIFP), which covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-SOEs with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB (US$750,000) between 1998 and 2007, 
for the systematic examinations. The data of Innofund provide us a perfect opportunity to answer 
the research questions we raise. First, Innofund is the largest Chinese public R&D program that 
supports corporate R&D activities of SMEs. The examination on this program is therefore 
sufficiently representative for addressing our questions. Second, Innofund experienced a 
significant change in the governance in 2005 because of an exogenous policy shock. Such 
change helps us to conduct quasi-experiment estimations using a difference-in-difference 
approach to capture the effects of the governance of public R&D programs.  
Based on such data, two major mechanisms of public R&D programs are examined, 
namely, ex-ante selection and ex-post monitoring mechanisms. The first question concerns the 




subsidies choose firms that are more or less productive than the others? The second question 
pertains to the identification of ex-post value-added effects of the public R&D support; 
specifically, do public R&D subsidies enhance the productivity of the firms they support? 
Subsequently, we investigate how the change of the governance of public R&D programs from a 
centralized to a relatively decentralized system owing to the exogenous policy change affects the 
efficacy of the two mechanisms mentioned before.  
Our results show that public R&D subsidy programs choose to support firms with high 
productivity and the productivity of these chosen firms is further improved after they acquire 
government support. Public R&D subsidy programs pay less attention to observable or 
measureable performance measurements in ex-ante project selection and the ex-post effects are 
stronger when the governance of such programs is more decentralized. Finally, the better the 
decentralization is implemented by local governments, the stronger the effects of public R&D 
subsidies are observed. We employ propensity score matching (PSM) strategy and two-stage 
estimations with an instrumental variable to identify the ex-post effects of public R&D subsidies. 
Several other approaches, including quasi-difference-in-difference estimations, moving time-
window cutoffs, and ruling out co-existing external shocks, are utilized to check the robustness 
of the effects of governance change of the public R&D program. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why public R&D 
subsidies are expected to have an impact on firm productivity in China and how the governance 
of public R&D support potentially influences the effects of such programs. Section 3 introduces 
the institutional background and the policy change of the Innofund program. Section 4 introduces 
the samples, data, and variables. Section 5 presents the empirical findings on the effects of public 




findings on the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies and the robustness checks. 
Section 7 concludes this study with the implications of the empirical findings to theory, policy-
making and business practice.  
II. Public R&D subsidies, the governance of such programs and firm productivity    
2.1 Public R&D subsidies and firm productivity    
The effects of public R&D subsidies on firm productivity depend on several factors. First, 
the tradeoffs between the adjustment costs of R&D investment and the liquidity constraints of 
firms may affect the effects of public R&D programs. Given the fact that investing in R&D 
activities can be a complicated decision-making process, and that implementing such R&D 
activities may involve various costs (Lucas, 1967), firms have to calculate the costs and benefits 
of initiating adjustment and decide whether to take actions upon acquiring government support. 
If an awarded firm chooses to finance itself regardless of whether it gains public R&D support or 
not, then we expect the adjustment costs of additional R&D investment to be too high for the 
company. In this situation, government support may substitute the private R&D investment that 
exerts limited effects on R&D investments and firm productivity. However, if the awarded firm 
is financially constrained and chooses not to finance itself if there were no government support, 
then the firm is expected to take actions with government support and the effects of the public 
R&D program should be observed. In such a case, we infer that the stronger the liquidity 
constraints faced by firms, the stronger the observed effects of public support are. Indeed, Lach 
(2002) and Lööf and Hesmati (2005) evident that the effects of public support are particularly 
strong for small firms, which are expected to face high-level liquidity constraints.  




firms with public R&D support have increased access to other external finance in the market 
(Lerner, 2000; Meuleman and de Maeseneire, 2008). Direct financial support may not be the 
only reason a firm applies for public R&D support; rather, companies may maximize the 
certification effect of such program, which may help them gain other sources of external 
financial support. In general, projects sponsored by public R&D subsidies are periodically 
assessed by administrative agencies. Firms are also required to submit final reports once the 
projects expire. Failed evaluations send negative signals to potential external financiers. 
Therefore, firms may have to prove their performance to secure the certification effect of public 
R&D support, specifically when the financial constraints are strong, the financial market is not 
well-developed, and the credit system does not function well.  
Public R&D subsidies are expected to have significant effects on SMEs in China. 
Chinese SMEs have suffered from severe financial constraints due to profound information 
issues and the monopolized banking sector by state-owned banks (Gordon and Li, 2003; Allen et 
al., 2005). Firms, especially high-tech SMEs, are expected to value government grants and the 
certification effect of such grants. On the basis of the aforementioned theoretical reasoning and 
the context of China, we posit the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms backed by public R&D subsidies experience significantly stronger 
improvements in productivity after winning the grant compared to their non-government-backed 
counterparts and to themselves before the infusion of government grants in China.    
2.2 Governance of public R&D program and its effects 
The major rationale for government interventions in corporate R&D activities is market 
failure (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1990). Such rationale suggests that government 
incentives and capabilities are important factors to determine the effects of public R&D support. 




interventions may cause (Stigler, 1971; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2013). It 
therefore calls for solid examinations on how public R&D programs are governed and how the 
governance influences the effects of such programs.  
First, the quality of project selection depends on the structure of organizations. Based on 
incentive theory, Sah and Stiglitz (1991) argue that decentralized decision-making system 
provides more incentives to local knowledge holders to exert more efforts in project selection. 
Hence, with the same evaluation costs, hierarchical organizations delay project selection, reject 
good projects, and reduce the total number of project portfolios. By contrast, decentralized 
organizations accelerate the selection process and increase the number of selections by reducing 
communication costs and information issues. However, decentralized decision making may 
accept bad projects. Therefore, the authors propose that the performance of a decentralized 
project evaluation is better than that of a centralized project evaluation provided that the portfolio 
has better quality. 
Following the information approach, Aghion and Tirole (1997) emphasize the trade-off 
between the loss of control and ex-ante incentives of the agents to acquire information in 
decentralization. Dessein (2002) develops a model where decentralization to a specialized agent 
entails a loss of control for the principal, coupled with the simultaneous reduction of the agent’s 
incentive to miscommunicate information to the principal. Stein (2002) further suggests that 
decentralized organizations are more attractive when the information required is “softer,” 
whereas centralized organizations are more favorable when the information required can be 
“hardened” without cost.  
Several studies on the decentralization of decision making are principally derived from 




centralized system to the problem of adverse selection. Qian and Xu (1998) further extend this 
discussion in the context of innovation investment when information issues are profound and 
when distinguishing the quality of the project by ex-ante screening is difficult. They suggest that 
centralization increases mistakes by rejecting promising projects that delays innovation. Such 
efficiency loss caused by soft budget constraints increases when prior knowledge worsens. By 
contrast, decentralized decision making may not only reduce ex-ante screening costs but also 
terminate bad projects ex-post, such that both types of errors mentioned previously may be 
reduced. The effects of decentralization should be evident in investment when the uncertainty is 
high and the project quality is difficult to predict ex-ante.    
The aforementioned theories suggest a few potential consequences of the governance of 
public R&D support. First, with a centralized decision-making system, local governments may 
have been risk-averse and rely mainly on “hard” or “measureable” information of the firms, 
which are less likely to be missed in the information passage process, in recommending high-
tech projects (e.g. Sterin, 2002; Dessein, 2002). Therefore, we shall expect firms selected by the 
public R&D program under a more centralized system show better performance in observable 
and measurable indicators at the time of receiving government grant than those selected under a 
more decentralized system.  We posit the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Firm performance reflected by observable measures may be given less weight in 
project selection after the governance of public R&D program becomes more decentralized.  
Furthermore, with a more decentralized decision-making system, the interests of local 
governments and the central government are more aligned and local governments may have 
stronger incentives to ensure the quality of the awardees (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991; Dewatripont 




served as bases for recommending and selecting firms with severe financial constraints and great 
growth potential which are more likely to be successful. With such efforts, we expect to observe 
stronger ex-post effects of public R&D programs governed under a more decentralized system. 
Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The ex-post effects of public R&D subsidies are stronger after the governance of 
such programs becomes more decentralized. 
Finally, China is large and heterogeneous in both institutional aspects and economic 
endowments that the implementation of the policies may vary across-regions. As discussed by 
Xu (2011), under the regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime in China, the central 
government mainly controls through the political and personnel governance structure, whereas 
the governance of the local economy is delegated to local governments (Xu, 2011). Sub-national 
governments significantly influence local resource allocation and policy implementation from 
the central government driven by different incentives of the local governors. Such variations 
should be related to the implementation and the effects of the Innofund policy change in 2005.  
We posit the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: The more actively the local government implements the decentralization policy of 
the public R&D program, the stronger the effects of such program are.  
III.   Innofund program and its governance  
In the previous section, we hypothesize how public R&D subsidies and the governance of 
such subsidies may affect firm productivity based on theories and the context in China. We 
utilize the data from the Innofund program to empirically test the hypotheses posited in this study. 
As the largest public R&D program supporting SMEs in China, the Innofund program is 




experienced a significant change in the governance in 2005 because of an exogenous policy 
shock that may help us to capture the effects of the public R&D program governance. In this 
section, we introduce the institutional background and the governance of the Innofund program.  
Innofund is a special public R&D program established upon the approval of the State 
Council in May 1999. As the first nation-wide policy-guiding R&D program, Innofund aims to 
“facilitate and encourage the innovation activities of small and medium technology-based 
enterprises (SMTEs) and the transformation of research achievements by ways of financing, 
trying to bring along and attract outside financing for R&D investment of SMTEs”. From 1999 
to 2013, the Innofund program provided more than 29.43 billion RMB to 58,267 projects. The 
size of direct investments by Innofund seems modest compared with the total public R&D 
expenditure. However, according to official reports, Innofund has induced 1:11 external finance 
from local governments, banks, and venture capitalists. 
Various principal criteria regulate applications for Innofund. First, the projects should 
comply with the national industrial technology policies, show relatively high potential for 
economic and social benefits, and possess strong capacity for market competition. Second, the 
applicant should be a SMTE with no more than 500 employees in total, among whom no less 
than 30% should have higher education. Third, the annual R&D investment of the firm should be 
at least more than 3% of its total sales, and the number of direct R&D employees should be more 
than 10% of the total number of employees. Fourth, firms with leading products in the market 
with economies-of-scale production must demonstrate good economic performance and have a 
leverage ratio lower than 70%. Priority projects include those with innovative technology or 
independent intellectual property; projects founded by research personnel or overseas returnees 




universities, and research institutions; and projects that use new and high technology to revive 
the stock assets of traditional industries and drive job creation. 
Two levels of government agencies are involved in the administration of Innofund. At the 
central level, the Innofund Administration Center (IAC) at the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) is responsible for Innofund operations, including issuing application 
guidelines, proposing the preferred fields and industries for each year, screening and evaluating 
projects, conducting midterm supervision on individual projects, and closing contracts with firms. 
A consulting committee composed of technology and management specialists, economists, and 
entrepreneurs helps identify preferred supporting areas and provides advice on Innofund 
guidelines. At the local level, each province has an Innofund office under the Provincial Science 
and Technology (S&T) Department, which reports to the IAC.   
The function of the local Innofund office was significantly changed in 2005 because of a 
policy change announced in January of that year. Specifically, the policy change simplified the 
application processes, decentralized project screenings and evaluations, and delegated power to 
local Innofund offices in project selection and monitoring. Before 2005, the operation of 
Innofund was hierarchical and centralized. Local Innofund offices bridged the IAC and local 
firms without any involvement in project selection. During this period, the local Innofund offices 
had three major responsibilities. First, these offices delivered and endorsed IAC guidelines or 
policies to local firms or agencies to help them prepare the required application documents. 
Second, local offices collected the application materials and transferred them to IAC. Third, the 
offices certified the qualifications of the candidates. A panel of experts at the IAC then evaluated 
the recommended projects, and the IAC promulgated the final funding decisions. Local Innofund 




for the award. Meanwhile, the local governments did not have to commit any resources to the 
recommended projects until the IAC had announced its final decision. After the IAC reaches a 
resolution, the Provincial Department of Finance was normally required to match 50% of the 
total support from the central governments to the projects selected by the IAC. 
In January of 2005, a new governance system was introduced. The system considerably 
increased the transparency of project screening and decentralized the decision making in project 
selection, evaluation and monitoring, thus shifting the roles of local Innofund offices. First, the 
local governments at the provincial level were required to set up their own Innofund programs 
and take responsibility for the initial project selection. The local project assessments comprised 
30% of the final decision of the IAC. Different from the previous practice, local Innofund offices 
were required to commit at least 50% of the proposed support, 25% for some provinces in 
western China, to the locally selected projects before recommending such projects to the IAC. 
Local Innofund offices were also required to publicize the lists of projects these offices planned 
to recommend two weeks before submitting the projects to the IAC. Therefore, these offices 
must respond to any public criticisms on the proposed projects. 
The new governance system introduced in 2005 brought out some creative operations in 
collecting and screening information at the local level. For example, Zhejiang province further 
delegates project recommendation to the lower city- or county-level governments, and thus the 
provincial government is only responsible for granting funds. Chongqing and Hunan provinces 
cooperate with local institutions, such as local industrial and commercial bureaus, tax bureaus, 
law firms, accounting and auditing firms, to acquire firm information. Moreover, most provinces 
start fostering Innofund recommendation agencies (IRAs) which help them to perform due 




matching funds committed by local Innofund offices. The total number of projects recommended 
by the local governments in 2005 was 4,207, and the amount of funds arranged by local 
governments was over 1.2 billion RMB during the application process, which was approximately 
six times of the amount local governments used to provide as matching funds annually before 
2005. 
After the decentralization of the Innofund governance in 2005, an obvious increase in the 
success rate of Innofund applications is observed. As shown in Table 1, between 1999 and 2004, 
25,190 firms applied for Innofund, putting in a request of RMB 25 billion. Comparatively, 
20,179 firms applied for Innofund between 2005 and 2008, putting in a request of RMB 16 
billion. Eventually, 6,410 firms (25.4% of the total applicants) and 8,174 firms (40.5% of the 
total applicants) were rewarded between 1999 and 2004 and between 2005 and 2008, 
respectively. The summary statistics suggest a few points. First, the total amount of Innofund 
support increased significantly after 2005. Second, the demand for Innofund also increased 
within the same period. Third, the size of the requested funds and the awarded funds per project 
decreased after 2005. Therefore, the data suggest that the success rate change after 2005 is 
correlated with the increased total amount of available funds and the decreased size per award. 
However, given that the increase of Innofund provision was endogeneized (no fixed annual 
budget for Innofund), we could not easily conclude whether the success rate was driven by the 
increase in the provision of Innofund support or by the increased number of recommended firms 
of high quality after 2005.  
To summarize, the case of the Innofund program provides us a perfect opportunity to 
estimate the public R&D programs and the governance of such programs in China. Based on the 




expect that Innofund support has positive effects on firm productivity. Moreover, the 
decentralization of Innofund governance in 2005 should affect both the ex-ante selection and the 
ex-post effects of the this public R&D program.  
IV. Data, sample, and variables    
The data of this study are collected from two major sources. First, the basic information 
on Innofund-backed firms is obtained from the official Innofund program website 
(http://www.innofund.gov.cn). Since 1999, the names of Innofund-backed firms have been 
publicly announced on the website annually. Second, firm-level data on financial information 
and other firm-specific characteristics are derived from the ASIFP database. ASIFP consists of 
all state-owned and non-state-owned industrial firms with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB 
(US$750,000) from 1998 to 2007. This database provides sophisticated financial and other firm-
specific information, including location, industry, age, and ownership structure. ASIFP is 
available until 2009, but we choose not to use the data for 2008 and 2009 mainly because of the 
poor data quality after 2008 and financial crisis in 2008, and the answers to our research 
questions are not significantly constrained by up-to-date data.  
We borrow the data matching strategies used by NBER Patent Data Project following 
Guo et al. (2016, 2017).  As a first step, we standardize the firm names in the two databases. We 
create a “standard name” for all firms in the two databases by removing the punctuation, space, 
or other special characters (e.g., !@#$%^&*-=[/]\ etc.) and standardizing the legal entity 
identifiers (e.g. we convert Limited into Ltd.). We then create a “stem name” for all firms by 
removing all legal entity identifiers of firm names. After standardization of firm names, we 




We employ both computerized and manual matching strategies. We first match the Innofund-
backed firms to the ASIFP database through “standard names,” locations (at city level), and 
industries of firms to generate a matched file called “full matching.” Subsequently, we match 
Innofund-backed firms to the ASIFP database by “stem names,” locations (at city level) and 
industries of the firm to generate a matched file called “partial matching.” We then combine the 
matching results of the two matching approaches and delete the duplicates by using the identical 
legal person codes of each firm by year. By Chinese law, firm names cannot be the duplicate in 
the same city. Therefore, as long as we control the firm location at city level, there should not be 
duplicates in firm names. After computerized matching, we cross check the matching results 
manually to ensure accuracy of the matching results by using Google and Baidu search engines. 
Finally, 2638 firms that won Innofund at least once between 1999 and 2007 are identified for the 
estimations. The final sample consists of 18,224 firm-year observations for Innofund-backed 
firms.   
A control group is subsequently constructed to compare Innofund- and non-Innofund-
backed firms in terms of productivity. The control group is generated in several steps to ensure 
that the results are not driven by a specific matching method. The non-Innofund-backed firms 
(i.e., firms that were eligible for Innofund but did not apply or did not win in a given year) are 
initially identified from the ASIFP by granting years of the paring Innofund-backed firms. The 
official Innofund selection criteria are announced each year. A firm is eligible for Innofund 
application if it has an industry code that is the same as the codes of the awarded group, has 
fewer than 500 employees, and has a leverage ratio lower than 70%. After the firms which are 
eligible for Innofund application but not awarded are determined, one-to-five matched pairs are 




controlling for location (provincial level) in the year of granting of funds to the Innofund-backed 
firms (the year related to the non-Innofund-backed counterpart is the same as the granting year 
for the matched Innofund-backed firms). Such approach allows us to conduct detailed 
comparisons between Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed firms in different dimensions. Finally, 
64,474 firm-year observations are obtained for 12,025 eligible firms. However, these firms are 
eligible but not supported by the Innofund program.  
We are interested in the change in productivity after the firms receive the support from 
the public R&D program. Productivity is measured by TFP. In this study, TFP is calculated by 
different methods for accuracy to ensure that the conclusions are not driven by a specific TFP 
measure. The first measure (TFP_ols) is a straightforward OLS residual from a log-linear 
transformation of the general Cobb–Douglas production function. The OLS production function 
estimates may be biased once the unobservable shocks correlate with input levels. The OLS 
method also lacks dynamic consideration. Hence, for the second method, we follow Olley and 
Pakes (1996), who used investment as a proxy for the unobservable production shocks. This 
semi-parametric method is adopted to control for the simultaneity caused by unobserved 
productivity and non-random sample selection induced by the different probability of exits for 
small and large low-productivity firms. TFP_op1 is the TFP calculated by following Olley and 
Pakes (1996) with time trends, whereas TFP_op2 is the TFP of the firm without time trends 
(Appendix A specifies the details on how TFP is calculated). 
In this study, several firm-specific variables, including age, size, leverage ratio, and 
ownership structure are controlled. Information on firm characteristics is derived from the ASIFP 
(1998–2007). Firm_Age is measured by the logarithm form of the age of the firm in a given year. 




error. The average firm age of Innofund-backed firms is approximately 10 years, which is similar 
to that of non-Innofund-backed firms in the random sample. Firm_Size is measured by the 
logarithm form of the total number of employees of the firm. Lvg_rt is the ratio of total liability 
over the total assets of the firm in a given year. Finally, we control for the ownership structure of 
the firm. State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. 
The variables used are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate outliers. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the sampled Innofund-backed firms, and Panel A 
shows the industry distribution of these firms. Innofund support is generally concentrated on 
eight industries that belong to high-tech industries, as defined by the National Bureau of 
Statistics. Overall, 81% of the sampled Innofund-backed firms are in high-tech industries. The 
Innofund allocation is consistent with the goal of supporting corporate R&D activities. Panel B-1 
exhibits the annual distribution of the release of the first round of Innofund grant to the firms for 
both the sampled Innofund-backed firms and the full sample of Innofund-backed firms across 
1999 and 2007. Panel B-2 presents the annual distribution of the release of the first round of 
Innofund grant to the firms for the full sample across 2008 and 2013 that is beyond the 
examination period of this study due to the low quality of the firm-level data. Panel B-1 shows 
that from 1999 to 2007, the sampled Innofund-backed firms have similar yearly distributions 
compared with those in the full sample, suggesting the representativeness of the sample in this 
aspect. 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of Innofund-backed firms and firms in the control 
group across 1998 to 2007. Table 3 shows that, on the average, Innofund-backed firms 
outperform non-Innofund-backed ones in almost all performance measurements including TFP, 




sales from new products over total sales.  At the same time, Innofund-backed firms are larger in 
terms of total sales and total number of employees and have lower leverage ratios across the 
examination period. The ages of the firms do not exhibit considerable difference. The maximum 
size (measured by total number of employees) of both Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed firms 
are more than 500, which is the standard criteria of Innofund selection. The results are not driven 
by matching error when creating the control group but rather by the following reasons. First, the 
information presented in Table 3 comprises 10 years of firm-year observations, and our matching 
of the control group is based on the size of the firms at the time Innofund was awarded. Some 
firms that gained Innofund in earlier years have grown into much larger firms over time and the 
size of some firms are far larger than just 500 employees. Second, firms identified as “high-tech” 
firms by the Provincial S&T Department are not restricted by the Innofund application 
requirement in terms of the number of employees. Thus, some Innofund-backed firms were 
indeed larger than the requirement of the Innofund program when they were funded. To secure 
the accuracy of the estimations, we include the number of employees as one of the matching 
criteria in PSM to conduct the robustness checks, which is discussed in detail in subsection 5.3.  
V. Empirical findings on the effects of public R&D subsidies 
5.1. Public R&D subsidies and firm productivity: baseline estimations  
 In the subsequent subsections, we examine whether public R&D subsidies select firms 
with higher productivity and explore whether the government support subsequently affects the 
productivity of the firms based on the data from the Innofund program. Identification concerns 
are addressed using various approaches, including PSM strategy and two-stage estimations 




First, we conduct logit regressions, a set of cross-sectional data analyses on the firm’s 
productivity in the year before the Innofund grant is infused, to determine whether Innofund 
chooses firms with higher productivity. The dependent variable is Innofund; the dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firm is backed by Innofund, and 0 if otherwise. Table 4 reports the results 
of the logit regressions. It shows that TFP measured by all approaches is significantly and 
positively associated with Innofund. This finding implies that firms are more likely to be 
supported by Innofund if they have higher productivity. In particular, an increase in the TFP_ols 
by 0.35 from its mean (approximately 100% of its mean) increases its likelihood to be selected 
by the Innofund program by 2%, and an increase in TFP_op1 by 2.63 from its mean 
(approximately 100% of its mean) increases its likelihood to be selected by Innofund by 4%. We 
also control for the leverage ratio, size, age, and state ownership. The regression results further 
depict that firm age and leverage ratio are significantly and negatively correlated with Innofund. 
Uniformly, Innofund tends to select younger firms and firms with lower leverage, consistent with 
the goals and project selection criteria of Innofund. However, firm size is significantly and 
positively associated with Innofund, implying that larger firms are more likely to be selected by 
Innofund.  
To examine whether public R&D subsidies subsequently affect the productivity of firms, 
we implement the fixed effect panel data regression approach through the following regression 
model:  
y𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖, (1) 
where  𝑖  indexes firms, 𝐼  refers to time, and yit are dependent variables used to measure the 




gained Innofund support at time t, and 0 if otherwise. A vector of control variables are indicated 
by 𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑒𝑖 is used to control time-invariant firm-specific unobserved variables, and 𝑒𝑖 is used to 
control for yearly fixed effects. The effects of Innofund on productivity are represented by 𝛿. 
The preceding equation is estimated on the Innofund-backed firm sample and randomly matched 
non-Innofund-backed firm sample. 
The monetary effect of the funding is also examined. With estimations on the total 
amount of support awarded, we may obtain additional insights into the extent to which 
government R&D funding eases the financial constraints of firms in China, where resource 
allocation is biased. We modify our model by replacing the dummy variable InnoAftit with 
InnoAmtit to estimate the monetary effect of the new funding. InnoAmtit is equal to the dollar 
amount of Innofund awarded if the firm has gained the support at time t and 0 if otherwise. 
Table 5 presents the estimation results. Panels A and B report how the award of Innofund 
and the amount of Innofund grant affect firm productivity, respectively. Panel A shows that 
InnoAftit is significantly and positively associated with firm TFP measured by all the three 
approaches, suggesting that Innofund-backed firms have significantly higher productivity than 
non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the funds were infused. For instance, 
Models (2) and (3) reveal that, after winning Innofund grant, Innofund-backed firms have 9.4% 
and 7.8% higher TFP, measured respectively by OP approach with and without time trends, than 
those non-Innofund-backed firms as well as the same firms before the funds were infused. Our 
main findings remain when we measure public R&D support by the total amount of the grant 
awarded as shown in Panel B. For instance, Models (2) and (3) display that 1 million Yuan of 




We also reiterate the regressions conducted in Panel B by replacing the absolute figure of 
the funding with the ratios of the funds over total profits and over total free cash, assuming that 
the relative weights of the funds have different effects on firm productivity. However, we do not 
observe statistically significant relationship between these relative measures of funding and the 
productivity of firms (the results of this procedure are not presented due to limited space). The 
results of the regressions indicate that for SMEs facing severe financial constraints, any amount 
of external financing may help them to improve their performance. 
5.2 Identification of the ex-post effects of the public R&D program  
We have demonstrated the significant and positive relationship between public R&D 
program and firm productivity. However, the causality is indeterminate because the positive 
correlation may be caused by other factors. First, the selection is not random, as mentioned in the 
previous sections and as shown in Table 4. The firms that are more likely to generate higher 
productivity in the future are more likely to be selected by public R&D program. Thus, the 
positive association between firm productivity and public R&D support may be caused by an ex-
ante selection bias. In such case, firms might have generated the increased productivity even 
without the government support. 
The PSM algorithm proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is utilized to construct the 
control sample, through which the ex-ante selection effect can be controlled. Government-
supported firms are matched with non-government-supported firms on multiple dimensions in 
the year prior to the awarding of the government grant. In our study, the propensity score is the 
predicted probability of a firm winning an Innofund grant. When constructing the sample of non-




selected based on their two-digit SICs, location, size, innovation, financial performance and 
productivity of the firm in the year prior to Innofund awarding. We also control innovation 
output of the firm measured by the stock of the patents and the ratio of sales from new products 
over total sales of the firm because innovation is a major criterion for Innofund selection. 
Financial performance of the firm measured by ROA is further controlled because according to 
the Innofund application guide, the applicant should be healthy in financial performance. We 
also match the productivity of Innofund-backed firms and their counterparts measured by TFP. 
Specifically, one-to-five nearest-neighbor PSM is used to identify non-Innofund-backed firms. 
These criteria ensure that Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms are similar in various 
aspects at the time before the funds were infused to Innofund-backed firms. We also impose 
common support restrictions during matching, and our results are robust if we remove the 
restrictions.   
The t-statistics of balancing tests indicate that the two groups of firms are similar in 
relevant aspects after PSM. The balancing tests for firm size and ROA presented in Table B-1 
show that Innofund-backed firms are significantly larger and have significantly higher ROA than 
non-Innofund-backed ones at the time of being granted if we use a random draw sample. 
However, after the PSM, the differences in size and ROA between Innofund-backed firms and 
those firms in the control group in the granting year are no longer statistically significant. Such 
results suggest that selection biases are controlled to some extent with PSM. Results of balancing 
tests for other matching variables are similar , and they are available by request.  
Subsequently, Equation (1) is re-estimated based on this newly matched sample.  Table 6 
displays the results of the PSM-based analysis. Panel A of Table 6 presents the first-step results 




Innofund awarding. It shows a successful matching procedure. The means of most control 
variables (except the ratio of sales from new products and firm TFP measured by OP without 
time trend controlled) for the treated and control groups after PSM are not significantly different. 
Panel B reports the treatment effect. The estimation results for the treatment effect of Innofund 
based on the PSM sample, in which the ex-ante selection effect has been controlled, are similar 
to those for the random sample. The economic magnitudes of Innofund on productivity decrease 
but remain statistically significant. Model (2) shows that firms experience a 10.4% increase in 
TFP measured by OP method with time trend controlled. The estimates suggest that government-
supported firms outperform non-government-supported firms in terms of TFP after the potential 
ex-ante selection effect is controlled with the PSM approach. 
A significant limitation of the PSM methodology is its inability to capture the effects of 
unobservable variables. Instead of public R&D support, missing variables may contribute to the 
strong productivity improvements of government-subsidized firms. For instance, we are unable 
to measure the R&D capability of firms or observe the management capability of executives 
based on existing data, although both factors may contribute to firm productivity. To address the 
concerns of unobservable variables, we apply two-stage estimations using an IV to identify the 
firms that won government grants. A proper IV must be correlated to the endogenous variable 
while unrelated to the unobserved variables that may affect the dependent variables, which are 
the productivities of firms in this case. 
The IV we use in this study is the total investment in fixed assets over GDP made by 
local governments at county level annually (Fixassets). This IV is related to Innofund selection 
while exogenous from productivity of individual firms. Under the RDA regime in China, local 




local governments compete with one another for economic growth and seek for resources and 
supports from the central government. Normally, the more ambitious the local government is, 
the more likely it makes investments in fixed assets. Therefore, local governments, which invest 
more in fixed assets, may be more likely to support local firms to participate in the competition 
of public R&D programs and make the effort to lobby upper-level governments for awarding the 
grants to the local firms. Therefore, firms located in the county where the local government 
invests more in fixed assets may have higher probability of being selected by public R&D 
programs. However, the county-level investment made by the local governments should not be 
related to the unobserved factors affecting individual firm productivity. The information on local 
government investment across 1998 to 2007 is obtained from the city yearbooks.  
Our empirical model consists of a selection and an outcome equation. Thus, we utilize a 
heterogeneous treatment model, which accounts for the selection of observables and 
unobservables, as well as for post-selection heterogeneity, to conduct the 2SLS (Heckman et al., 
2006). The results of the 2SLS based on the random sample are reported in Table 7. Panel A of 
Table 7 presents the results from the first-stage estimations, which show that investment in 
fixed assets made by county-level governments is positively correlated with the dummy 
variable that indicates whether the firm is awarded the Innofund. Such result confirms the 
relevance of the IV. The results of the second-stage estimation are presented in Panel B of 
Table 7. Models (1) to (3) show that a firm experiences higher TFP after it wins Innofund 
grants compared with non-Innofund firms and the same firm before receiving Innofund support. 
The robustness of the 2SLS results is further verified by repeating the procedure for the 
samples matched by PSM. The main conclusions remain valid after we control for the potential 




empirically confirm that winning public R&D support positively affects the productivity of 
firms even after controlling the endogenous nature of such support. 
5.3 Other potential biases and additional robustness checks   
Our examinations are carried on by using the largest public R&D program for high-tech 
SMEs and the most representative and sophisticated firm level panel database in China. Yet, 
several limitations with the ASIFP dataset and the particular Innofund program may cause 
biases to our estimations. We discuss how we address such concerns in this subsection.   
First, R&D expenditure is an essential variable that should be considered while 
examining the effects of public R&D program. However, ASIFP, which is the only available 
large-sampled firm-level panel dataset in China, does not provide information on R&D 
expenditure except for the years 2005 to 2007. Therefore, R&D expenditure or R&D stock 
cannot be employed as criteria to construct the control group sample for the whole period. Yet, 
given that R&D expenditure is one of the most important factors that may affect productivity, we 
utilize annual R&D expenditure information as criteria to match samples from 2005 to 2007 and 
check the robustness of the results. The estimation results are presented in Table B-2, which 
shows that the findings on the general public R&D program effects stay as robust.   
Second, ASIFP provides detailed firm-specific information for all state-owned and non-
state-owned enterprises with annual sales of 5 million RMB or above between 1998 and 2007 
that account for 90% of the total sales of all industrial firms in China (Guo et al., 2016). Given 
this database does not cover non-state-owned firms with annual sales less than 5 million RMB, 
our sample may have missed some non-state-owned government-subsidized firms whose sales 




disproportionally, our estimations may be biased. To ease such concerns, we first dig in the 
details of the composition of the firms covered by the database. ASIFP also provides information 
on the category of the firm size. Firms are defined as large, medium and small according to the 
number of employees and annual sales. According to this standard, medium-sized and small-
sized enterprises make up 11.48% and 84.90% of the enterprises covered by ASIFP 1998–2007, 
respectively. Large-sized enterprises only compose 3.62% of the total sample. Such results 
suggest that the majority (96.38%) of the firms covered by ASIFP 1998–2007 are SMEs. Hence, 
our estimations are not significantly biased. To further ease such concern, we control the size of 
the firm measured by the total sales in matching for both the randomly drawn and PSM samples. 
Our results are robust when we measure firm size by the total sales, total number of employees 
and value of total assets. Firm size is also controlled in the regression estimations.  
Third, another limitation with the data is that we do not have information on whether a 
firm is recognized as a high-tech firm by the Provincial S&T Department. ASIFP covers both 
technology-based and non-technology-based firms. Such data limitation may cause two concerns. 
In particular, Innofund targets supporting R&D oriented firms. Simply matching the industries of 
firms may not ensure that the firms in our control groups are technology-based firms. However, 
according to the Innofund application guides, to be identified as a “technology-based” firm is not 
a prerequisite for being a qualified applicant for Innofund. Innofund imposes some hard 
measures for firm size, industry, and R&D input as the principal standard for being a qualified 
applicant. Hence, as long as a firm falls in the industry selected by Innofund and satisfies the 
basic standard of being an applicant, it is eligible for applying for Innofund, though the selection 
of Innofund is certainly related to the technology level of the project. Given that the estimations 




the selection biases to some extent. Additionally, according to the Innofund application guide, 
firms identified as “high-tech” firms are not restricted by the principal criterion with employee 
number to apply for Innofund. In our estimations, all Innofund-backed firms that can be matched 
to ASIFP are covered no matter whether the employee number is larger or smaller than 500. We 
recognize the limitation potentially caused by such issues that the size of the Innofund-backed 
ones may be larger than non-Innofund-backed ones in the control group. In such case, potentially, 
the productivity of Innofund-backed ones may be overestimated, even though we have controlled 
the firm size in the regression estimations. To ensure the estimations are not biased because of 
such data issues, further robustness checks are conducted by imposing the number of employees 
as an alternative control variable for firm size in PSM. The findings on the Innofund effects 
based on this PSM sample stay as robust (The results are provided by request).  
 In summary, by using various approaches to identify the ex-post effects of public R&D 
subsidies, the concerns regarding selection biases, omitted variables, and other potential biases 
caused by the data limitations are relaxed. We confirm that public R&D subsidies exert 
significant and positive ex-post effects on firm productivity in China. Such findings are 
consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1.  
VI. Empirical findings on the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies 
6.1 The governance of public R&D subsidies and the ex-ante project selection  
In this section, we reveal how the governance of public R&D subsidies influences the ex-
ante selection of such programs. As we have discussed earlier, Hypothesis 2 predicts that firm 
performance reflected by observable measures may have been given less weight in project 




hypothesis, we first construct a variable 2005_Aft, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
the period between 2005 and 2007 and 0 if otherwise, to distinguish the before and after 
governance change of Innofund. We choose to use the end of 2004 as the cutoff to divide the two 
periods because the policy change of the Innofund program was announced in January of 2005 
and implemented in June of the same year as we have mentioned in the earlier text. Hence, the 
new selection system was carried out since 2005. The firm-level data of ASIFP were collected by 
the end of each year, meaning the data of 2005 represents the firm characteristics by the end of 
2005. By considering the time of the implementation of the policy change and the data 
characteristics of the panel data we use, we therefore suggest setting the end of 2004 as a cutoff 
point is appropriate to capture the changes of the governance of Innofund.   
We then observe the relationships between various observable firm performance variables 
and the selection of public R&D programs in general, and, the relationship between project 
selection and the interaction terms of 2005_Aft and such firm performance variables. Aside from 
firm TFP measured by the three methods, we further add firm performance variables, including 
financial returns, such as returns over total assets (ROA) and returns over total equity (ROE), 
labor productivity measured by the per capita value added (Value_add_per), innovation outputs 
such as the count of newly granted patent (Patent) and sales from new products over total sales 
(Newproduct_Rt), and,  the growth of the firm measured by the growth in total sales (Growth) in 
the year before the Innofund grant. The results of the logit estimations are presented in Table 8.  
As shown in Table 8, generally, all firm performance measures, including TFP, financial 
returns, labor productivity, and innovation outputs, are significantly and positively correlated 
with Innofund selection, except for the sales growth of the firm. Such results suggest that firm 




Innofund selection. However, when the interaction terms are examined, we find that the 
coefficients of interaction terms between firm financial performance, such as ROA, ROE, and 
2005_Aft, are significantly and negatively correlated with Innofund grant. Similarly, we observe 
a significant negative relationship between the interaction term of Patent and 2005_Aft with 
Innofund grant. Lastly, the coefficient for the interaction term of Value_add_per and 2005_Aft is 
also statistically negative. Such results suggest that after 2005, when the Innofund selection 
became more decentralized than before, some observable indicators for the firm performance, 
such as the return over total assets, return over total equity, per capita value added value, and the 
count of newly granted patents, became less important than before in determining whether the 
firm may win Innofund or not. No statistically significant relationship between Innofund 
selection and the interaction term of firm TFP and 2005_Aft is found.  
Our estimations suggest when the governance of the Innofund program becomes more 
decentralized, the selection of such program pays less emphasis to observable firm performance 
indicators, a result that is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2. However, we do not 
claim that such changes in selection are solely determined by the 2005 policy change of the 
Innofund program.  
6.2 The governance of public R&D subsidies and its ex-post effects 
To examine how the governance of public R&D subsides affects the ex-post effects on 
firm productivity, we conduct a series of regressions to compare the productivity of firms backed 
by Innofund before and after 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. The regression 
equation is as follows: 




All control variables remain the same as those in Equation (1). The InnoAft dummy 
variable is replaced with two dummy variables to specify the Innofund-backed firms before and 
after 2005. Inno_2005Bfr is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund 
support at time t and if the Innofund was granted before 2005, and equals 0 if otherwise. 
Inno_2005Aft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at 
time t and if the first Innofund was granted after 2005, and 0 if otherwise. 
Table 9 reports the regression results for the effects of the change in the governance of 
the Innofund program. Models (1) to (3) show that Inno_2005Bfr and Inno_2005Aft are 
significantly and positively correlated with the TFP of firms measured by the three approaches. 
This finding is consistent with those shown in Table 5. Importantly, we find that the coefficients 
of Inno_2005Bfr are smaller than those of Inno_2005Aft in the three regression models. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 9, Lincom tests indicate that the latter is significantly larger than the 
former. Across the three regression models, the coefficients of Inno_2005Aft are shown to be 
roughly threefold of those of Inno_2005Bfr. For instance, comparing to non-innofund-backed 
firms and the same firms before the Innofund infusion, firms supported by Innofund before 2005 
and after 2005 experience higher growth in productivity (as measured by the OLS approach) by 
6.4 and 16.7%, respectively. Similar results are shown with TFP measured by OP approaches.  
The findings shown in Table 9 are consistent with Hypothesis 3 which predicts that the 
more decentralized the governance of public R&D programs is, the more likely we observe 
stronger ex-post effects of such programs.  




 The results shown in Table 9 prove the improvements in the effects of public R&D 
subsidies when the governance of such programs becomes decentralized. However, it is difficult 
to claim that such improvements in firm productivity after 2005 are driven by the 
decentralization of Innofund governance because, essentially, the empirical practice we employ 
is to instrument a time effect. Hence, various approaches are used to identify the effects of 
Innofund decentralization and address such concerns.  
6.3.1 The co-existence of policy shocks with Innofund decentralization  
The first identification concern is the co-existence of external policy shocks with 
Innofund decentralization in 2005. If the decentralization of Innofund in 2005 coincides with any 
other external shocks that affect the gap in firm productivity of Innofund-backed and non-
Innofund-backed ones before and after 2005, the results we present in Table 9 may be interpreted 
into something else rather than the effects of decentralization of Innofund governance in 2005. 
To ease such concerns, we search for various outside shocks around 2005 that may have affected 
firm productivity. In general, two major shocks around 2005 may be relevant. First, the 
protection for private property rights was constitutionalized for the first time in China in March 
2004. Second, the Small and Medium Enterprise Board of Shenzhen Exchange (SME Board) 
opened in May 2004. These two outside shocks may have implications for the external financing 
and investment activities of firms through which the productivity may be affected.   
We first examine whether the constitutional recognition for private property rights in 
2004 may violate our findings on the decentralization effects of Innofund. First, although such 
constitutional change is applied to everyone and every organization in China, we expect it to 




private sector than those of firms in the public sector. If more firms from the private sector were 
more likely to be supported by Innofund after 2005, then the stronger effects of Innofund since 
2005 that we have discovered may be partially related to such constitutional change. Indeed, 
empirical examinations shown in Tables 4 and 8 reveal that firms with less state ownership were 
significantly more likely to be selected by Innofund.  
To identify whether such a selection preference of Innofund, which may be related to the 
recognition of private property rights, and may violate our previous finding on the effects of 
Innofund policy change in 2005, estimations are conducted by adding the interaction term of 
Inno_2005Aft and State_shr into the estimations for firm TFP in the revision process. The 
results are presented in Table 10. As shown in this table, the coefficients of interaction terms 
between the dummy variable Inno_2005Aft and State_Shr are statistically insignificant. 
Importantly, the coefficients of Inno_2005Aft remain significantly positive even after we include 
the interaction term into the estimations for firm TFP measured through all means. Such results 
imply that although the recognition of private property rights in 2004 may have affected the 
selection of Innofund after 2005, such selection effect does not violate the general findings on 
the stronger effects of Innofund since 2005 or reject our interpretations for the effects of the 
decentralization of Innofund governance.  
We then examine whether the opening of the SME Board in 2004 may have the power in 
explaining the stronger improvement in firm productivity that win public R&D support since 
2005. Specifically, we examine whether firms that have won Innofund since 2005 have a higher 
probability of being listed on the SME Board, or whether Innofund selects more firms listed on 
SME Board after 2005. If so, the 2005 effect of Innofund that we have observed may be partially 




end of 2007, among which 152 are in the manufacturing sector (in both high-tech and traditional 
industries). These 152 firms are matched with the randomly drawn sample and the PSM sample. 
In total, we only observe four IPO cases from the randomly drawn sample and the PSM sample, 
among which two are from the Innofund-backed group and two are from the non-Innofund-
backed group. As we employ the one-to-five rule to construct the control group (i.e., the non-
Innofund-backed firms), the results suggest that Innofund-backed firms are more likely to do IPO 
than their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. However, given that the total number of Innofund-
backed firms between 2005 and 2008 in our sample is greater than 1,100 and the number of 
matched non-Innofund-backed firms is greater than 5,000, we would not expect the 0.2% 
Innofund-backed firms, which went to IPO on SME Board, to statistically affect the gap between 
the TFP of the two groups. 
In summary, a few other outside shocks may have effects on firm productivity or the 
selection of the Innofund program since 2005. However, these shocks are not expected to violate 
the findings on the enlarged Innnofund effects after 2005 or reject our hypothesis on the positive 
effects of the decentralization of public R&D program governance.   
6.3.2 Policy implementations and the effects of public R&D subsidies   
To further identify the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies, we search for 
the cross-regional differences in the implementation of the Innofund policy change in 2005 to 
conduct a quasi-difference-in-difference estimation. Specifically, we focus on two major cross-
regional variations in terms of the implementation of the Innofund governance change in 2005. 
First, a significant variation exists in the establishment of Innofund recommendation agencies 




with greater decision-making power in project selection since 2005. Associated with such 
changes, local Innofund offices were encouraged to foster IRAs, which help to screen projects 
and conduct due diligence over the applicants. In such a way, local Innofund offices attempt to 
identify and select high-quality candidates more efficiently than before. The number of IRAs 
may thus be a good proxy for how well the local governments exert efforts to implement the new 
policy in 2005.  
Second, the amount of matching funds provided by local governments since 2005 varied 
substantially across regions. As we have discussed earlier, a major change in Innofund 
governance since 2005 is related to the commitment of local matching funds. According to the 
newly-introduced policy in 2005, provinces should have committed at least 50% (or 25% for 
some provinces in western China) of the requested funds as local matching funds to firms they 
recommend before they submit the applications to the IAC. Before the policy change in 2005, 
local governments did not have to commit any matching funds until the IAC made the decision 
for final selection. This change since 2005 is a major mechanism used to harden the budget 
constraints of the local governments and incentivize them to exert more efforts in project 
selection, given that the initially committed funds would be sunk if the projects were not 
awarded by the IAC later. The variation in the amount of matching funds provided by local 
governments is therefore a good indicator for how actively the local governments react to the 
Innofund policy change in 2005. After checking the data released in the Innofund annual report, 
we discover an obvious variation in terms of the ratio of the funds provided by local 
governments in 2005, which ranged from 0% (e.g., Henan, which is not located in western China) 
to 78% (e.g., Guizhou, which is located in western China). On average, local governments 




We use the above-mentioned cross-regional variations in the implementation of Innofund 
policy change in 2005 to identify the effects of the decentralization of Innofund governance. If 
Innofund decentralization since 2005 indeed helps to lift the effects of Innofund, we should 
expect to observe stronger Innofund effects in provinces where more IRAs are built and more 
matching funds are provided upfront by local governments in 2005. To test such hypotheses, we 
we construct two variables. First, IRA_per is the ratio of the total number of IRAs over the 
number of Innofund applications in a given province in 2005. Second, Matchingfunds is the 
ratio of total upfront matching funds provided by local governments over the amount of 
requested funds. A quasi-difference-in-difference approach is used to estimate the effects of 
Innofund policy change in 2005 using such newly constructed variables. The specification of the 
estimation is shown as follows:  
y𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_2005𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖, (4), 
where all the other variables remain similar to those of regression Equation (1), in which an 
interaction term between Inno_2005Aft and Policy is added. Policy represents the two variables, 
namely, IRA_per and Matchingfunds, which measure the implementation of the new Innofund 
policy in 2005 by local governments.   
The results are presented in Table 11. As shown in this table, Inno_Aft is significantly 
and positively correlated with firm TFP measured through any means, consistent with our 
findings that the productivity of firms are significantly stronger after they are awarded with 
Innofund compared with their non-Innofund-backed counterparts and themselves before winning 
the grant. Importantly, we observe that the coefficients of the interaction terms are constantly 




Innofund program, when the implementation of the policy change is better, the effects of this 
program are stronger. Taking Model (5) as an example, it shows that if a firm is awarded the 
Innofund, its TFP measured by OP method with time trend is about 0.04 higher than its 
counterpart and itself before the infusion of Innofund. But if the fund is awarded after 2005 and 
if the firm is located in a province with better implementation of the policy change, the increase 
is much higher. For example, Guizhou has a better implementation than Tibet does. When the 
implementation of the policy change is measured by Matchingfunds, Tibet committed 0 to the 
upfront matching funds, while Guizhou committed an upfront fund which is as high as 78.5% of 
the amount of requested funds. For the other things being equal, firms located in Guizhou on 
average have TFP 0.25 higher than those located in Tibet if they get their Innofund after 2005.  
The results presented in Table 11 support Hypothesis 4, confirming that the we should 
expect  stronger the effects  of public R&D subsidies when the decentralization of such programs 
are implemented better.  
6.4 Additional robustness checks   
Adding to the abovementioned identification strategies, we conduct additional robustness 
checks to ensure the robustness of our estimations. First, we examine the time window around 
the 2005 break by moving the time window to t−1 and t+1 periods to determine whether 2005 is 
a unique turning point that is associated with significant improvements of Innofund effects. 
Testing the time window is slightly sensitive in our context because the 2005 effect has already 
been observed, and we are aware of the policy change in 2005. In such a case, the existing 
effects of 2005 may add noise to the estimations of the time window if the cut-off of the timing 




granted since 2005 and their counterparts in the control group in the estimations, the effects of 
post-t−1 period would certainly be overestimated. Similarly, for the estimations of the time 
window of t+1, if we include firms granted in 2005 and their counterparts in the control group in 
the estimations, the effects of pre-t+1 period would be overestimated. Given such situation, we 
must abandon certain subsamples to estimate the time window. The details of the estimations and 
the results are provided in the following.  
We first focus on the estimations by moving the cutoff of the time period to t−1, that is, 
2004. As discussed, to precisely identify the time window, we abandoned firms receiving 
Innofund in and after 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. In other words, we 
solely focused on the subsample covering firms awarded with Innofund before and in 2004 and 
their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. We constructed two dummy variables. Inno_2004Brf is 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is granted with Innofund before 2004 or 0 if 
otherwise. Inno_2004 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm was granted in 2004 or 0 if 
otherwise. We then re-conducted the estimations shown in Table 9. The results are presented in 
Table B-3. As shown in Models (1) to (3) of Table B-3, the coefficients of Inno_2004Bfr are 
significantly positive, implying that firms backed by Innofund before 2004 have significantly 
stronger productivity than their non-Innofund-backed counterparts and the same firms before 
winning Innofund. In addition, the coefficients of Inno_2004 are positive but statistically 
insignificant for estimations on firm TFP measured through any means, implying that firms 
winning Innofund in 2004 do not seem to have significantly higher productivity than their non-
Innofund-backed counterparts or the same firms before the infusion of Innofund. It also implies 
that Innofund effects in 2004 are not as significant as those before 2004. Such results suggest that 




productivity gap of the Innofund-backed firms and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts 
before and after the cut-off time point does not exist.  
Thereafter, we estimate the results by moving the cutoff to t+1. Similarly, we omitted 
sampled firms granted with Innofund in 2005 and their counterparts in the control group from 
our estimations for the time window of t+1 to avoid the overestimation of the effects of Innofund 
in the pre-t+1 period. We constructed two dummy variables accordingly. Inno_2005Bfr is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm was granted before 2005 or 0 if otherwise. 
Inno_2006Aft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm was granted in 2006 or 2007 or 0 if 
otherwise. We then re-conducted the estimations shown in Table 9. The results are presented in 
Models (4) to (6) of Table B-3. As shown in the table, although Inno_2005Bfr and 
Inno_2006Aft are significantly and positively correlated with firm TFP measured by any means, 
the coefficients of Inno_2006Aft are significantly larger than those of Inno_2005Bfr. Such 
results are consistent with the results shown in Table 9 of this paper, confirming the significant 
increase in Innofund effects since 2005 when the Innofund governance became relatively 
decentralized. Combining the results presented in Table B-3 and Table 9, we suggest that 2005 is 
a turning point for the Innofund effects. Such results support Hypothesis 3 that effects are 
significantly stronger when the governance of public R&D subsidies is more decentralized.   
Another concern with the time window is related to the difference in the length of time 
for the examination periods before and after 2005. As the panel dataset is only available up to 
2007, for firms winning Innofund after 2005 and their counterparts in the control group, we can 
only observe ex-post effects up to three years. As a contrast, for firms winning Innofund before 
2005 and their counterparts in the control group, we may observe the ex-post effects up to eight 




are stronger than those in short run. In such case, the stronger effects of Innofund after 2005 we 
observe may be driven by the shorter length of examination periods for post-2005 awardees than 
those of before 2005. To address this concern, we constructed two more dummy variables to 
define the length for the examination periods after winning Innofund for pre-2005 awardees and 
their counterparts in the control group.  Inno_2005Bfr(1/3) equals to one if the firm is supported 
by Innofund before 2005 within three years after the firm received the funds and zero if 
otherwise. Inno_2005Bfr(4/8) equals one if the firm is supported by Innofund before 2005 and 
the firm have received the funds for more than three years and zero if otherwise. We then add the 
two newly defined dummy variables, together with the dummy variable Inno_2005Aft, into the 
estimations for firm productivity. The results are shown in Table B-4. As shown in this table, the 
coefficients of Inno_2005Bfr(1/3) are significantly and positively correlated with firm TFP 
measured by all means, indicating that before 2005, firms backed by Innofund experienced 
significantly stronger improvements in productivity after winning the grants within three years 
than their non-Innofund-backed counterparts and the same firm before winning the grants. 
However, the coefficients of Inno_2005Bfr (4/8) are not significant statistically, indicating the 
effects of Innofund disappear over time that is consistent with Guo et al. (2017). Meanwhile, we 
observe that the coefficients of Inno_2005Aft are constantly significantly and positively 
correlated with firm TFP measured through any means. Importantly, the Lincom tests show that 
the coefficients of Inno_2005Aft are significantly larger than those of Inno_2005Bfr(1/3). The 
results suggest that indeed the length of examinations matters. Yet, the robustness checks confirm 
that such 2005 effect is not driven by the length of the panel before and after 2005. The results 
shown in Table B-4 are consistent with our original findings on the positive effects of the 




Finally, this study also considers the normal cyclical productivity differences. First, we 
capture the normal cyclical productivity in the process of TFP estimations. In this study, we 
mainly use the OP method to estimate firm productivity. When we estimate the Cobb–Douglas 
production function for each two-digit SIC sector, we control not only the year fixed effect but 
also the sector fixed effect, which allows us to control cyclical trends over time for different 
sectors. Moreover, Total Outputit in the production function is deflated by the producer price 
index for manufactured products. Kit, the capital input by firm 𝑖 at time 𝐼, is deflated by the price 
index of investment in fixed assets, and  Mit , the intermediate inputs by firm 𝑖  at time 𝐼 , is 
deflated by the producer price index for purchasing products. We further conduct an additional 
estimation as a robustness check by adding annual per capita GDP (denoted as GDP_per) at the 
provincial level as a control variable. We add the interaction term of Inno_2005Bfr and 
GDP_per as well as interaction term of Inno_2005Aft and GDP_per to the estimations. In this 
way, we further capture the normal cyclical productivity differences over time and across regions. 
The results of the effects of Innofund in general and the effects of the governance change of 
Innofund in 2005 in particular remain robust even after we add the annual per capital GDP of the 
province to the estimations (estimation results are provided by request).  
In summary, by using various identification strategies and robustness checks, we confirm 
the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies. Consistent with the prediction of 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, the effects of public R&D subsidies on firm productivity are stronger when 
the governance of such programs becomes more decentralized and when the decentralization is 





Analyses on firm level panel data of the Innofund program in China show that public 
R&D subsidies choose to support firms with higher productivity. Moreover, after winning the 
public subsidies, government-supported firms experience significantly higher increase in 
productivity than other firms and the same firms before the grants are infused.  However, the 
ex-ante and ex-post effects of public subsidies vary depending on the governance of such 
subsidies. Observable performance measurements are less important in ex-ante project 
selection and the ex-post effects of public subsidies are significantly stronger under a more 
decentralized governance system.  
 This study contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, it complements to the 
existing literature that explores the heterogeneous effects of public R&D programs (e.g. David 
et al., 2000; Hsu et al., 2009; Lee, 2011; Sternberg, 2014; Guo et al., 2017) by providing a new 
perspective for evaluating public R&D policies. Specifically, we focus on the governance of 
public R&D subsidies and its effects that have been largely neglected. Despite a growing 
number of empirical examinations on effects of public R&D programs, the discoveries of such 
studies are inconclusive. Such inconclusiveness may not only be driven by the variations in the 
data or empirical approaches utilized, but also be related to the heterogeneity in the governance 
of those programs or the various market conditions under which such programs operate that 
have attracted little scrutiny. Utilizing an exogenous policy shock that leads to governance 
change of a public R&D program in China (i.e. Innofund) and the cross-regional variations in 
the implementation of such policy change, we identify the effects of the governance of public 






Second, this study contributes to the literature by providing further insights into whether 
the effects of the government initiatives in corporate R&D vary in different economic systems. 
The Chinese government has long played a central role in resource allocation (Li et al., 2008; 
Guo et al., 2014). Estimations on how public R&D support influences SMEs in emerging 
markets, especially in nations where the market economy is yet to function well, are still scarce. 
Therefore, the present study not only provides new insights into public R&D programs in China, 
but also offers implications on whether market failures in corporate R&D investments of SMEs 
are mitigated by public R&D programs under a regime, which differs from a typical market 
economy. 
Third, this study extends the literature on organizational structure and innovation by 
investigating such relationship under the context of public resource allocation. Our findings 
support the arguments derived from information approach (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). 
Specifically, our findings are consistent with the predictions of Dessein (2002) and Stein (2002) 
who argue that decentralization reduces the agent’s incentive to miscommunicate information to 
the principal and centralized organizations are more favorable when the information required can 
be “hardened”. Additionally, our findings support the theories that propose decentralization 
promotes efficient project selection when information issues are profound or distinguishing the 
quality of the project by ex-ante screening is difficult (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Qian and 
Xu, 1998).   
This study has important implications for policy-making that are applied to but not 
limited to China. Our estimations suggest that public R&D support is very important for SMEs. 
Yet, the effects of such public funding depend on how the programs are governed and how the 




making process and delegate power to local knowledge holders in project selection and 
monitoring to achieve better results from public R&D programs. Furthermore, the advantage of 
decentralized governance is not only for R&D programs; it is also applicable to other public 
programs through appropriate incentives and enhanced local frontier information. How to design 
and implement a public policy efficiently deserves more attentions from policy makers. 
Finally, this study has important implication to business practices. Above all, the 
innovation capacity determines the sustainability of the China’s growth and affects the 
competitive landscape of the global economy. By providing the insights into public R&D 
policies and the innovation capacity in China, this study helps foreign business practitioners 
obtain more understanding in the sustainability and competitiveness of SMEs in China. 
Meanwhile, this study provides information for Chinese entrepreneurs on the elements for the 




Table 1 Success rate of Innofund applications: 1999 to 2008 
Year # of  
applicants 
Total funds requested 
(RMB0000) 
Funds requested 
per project  




Amount awarded per 
project (RMB0000) 
Success rate of 
application  
1999 3,221 387,438 120.29 1,089 81,635 74.96 0.34 
2000 4,898 541,952 110.65 872 65,966 75.65 0.18 
2001 3,682 358,910 97.48 1,008 78,330 77.71 0.27 
2002 4,215 404,041 95.86 780 54,024 69.26 0.19 
2003 4,249 377,561 88.86 1,197 66,382 55.46 0.28 
2004 4,925 431,559 87.63 1,464 82,719 56.50 0.30 
2005 5,406 454,848 84.14 1,552 98,848 63.69 0.29 
2006 6,784 518,166 76.38 2,039 84,288 41.34 0.30 
2007* 1,982 155,474 78.44 2,113 125,620 59.45 1.07 
2008 6,007 509,046 84.74 2,470 146,209 59.19 0.41 
1999–2004 25,190 2,501,461 99.30 6,410 429,056 66.94 0.25 
2005–2008 20,179 1,637,534 81.15 8,174 454,965 55.66 0.41 
*Note: Some projects awarded in 2006 did not actually receive the funding from the Innofund program that year but in 2007. Hence, the success rate in 2006 was understated, 






Table 2  Industry and annual distribution of the sampled Innofund-backed firms 
Panel A: Industry Distribution (1999-2007)   Panel B-1: Annual Distribution of Projects (1999-2007) 















Raw chemical materials  26 306 11.60  1999 293 11.11 1,089 9.09 
Chemical products/Medicines 27 401 15.20  2000 217 8.23 869 72.6 
General-purpose machinery 35 268 10.16  2001 204 7.73 1,008 8.42 
Special-purpose machinery 36 336 12.74  2002 192 7.28 780 6.51 
Transport equipment 37 125 4.74  2003 230 8.72 1,197 9.99 
Electrical machinery and equipment 39 206 7.81  2004 345 13.08 1,464 12.22 
Communication equipment, computers, and  
other electronic equipment 40 353 13.38  2005 465 17.63 1,552 12.96 
Measuring instruments and machinery  
for cultural activity and office work 41 173 6.56  2006 327 12.40 1,905 15.91 
Others  470 17.81  2007 365 13.84 2,113 17.64 
Total  2,638 100  Total  2,638 100  11,977 100 
     PanelB-2 Annual Distribution of Projects (2008-2013) 
     2008   2,470 7.63 
     2009   5,847 18.07 
     2010   3,709 11.46 
     2011   6,534 20.20 
     2012   7,346 22.71 
     2013   6,446 19.92 








Mean Std. Dev. 
Non-Innofund-
backed firms (obs.)  
Mean Std. Dev. 
Firm_Age 18,222 10.065 7.414 64,456 10.161 7.587 
# Employees 18,224 301.197 375.397 64,474 161.195 216.231 
Lvg_rt 18,176 0.564 0.249 64,145 0.606 0.337 
State_Shr 18,079 0.109 0.284 63,530 0.128 0.319 
TFP_ols 17,088 0.363 0.987 59,855 0.03 1.182 
TFP_op1 17,091 2.697 1.443 59,878 2.425 1.582 
TFP_op2 17,091 2.398 1.045 59,878 2.203 1.272 
Newproduct_Rt 15,548 0.173 0.313 55,135 0.053 0.189 
Patent 18,224 0.699 2.838 64,474 0.098 0.803 
ROA 18,176 0.067 0.099 64,145 0.060 0.132 
ROE 18,147 0.145 0.487 63,877 0.116 0.687 
Sales (RMB 10,000) 18,224 83690.62 148757.6 64,474 41148.86 87107.16 
Sales_Growth 15,536 0.335 0.742 52,034 0.277 0.778 
Valueadd_per 18,112 111.299 159.603 63,878 93.481 159.037 
       
       




Table 4  Logit regressions for Innofund selection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
   Innofund Innofund Innofund 
Panel A TFP_ols 0.303***   
  (0.028)   
 TFP_op1  0.106***  
   (0.018)  
 TFP_op2   0.230*** 
    (0.026) 
 Firm_age −0.190*** −0.204*** −0.192*** 
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
 State_Shr −0.053 −0.176* −0.089 
  (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) 
 Lvg_rt −0.501*** −0.569*** −0.557*** 
  (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
 Firm_size 0.668*** 0.655*** 0.702*** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
 Constants −4.167*** −4.211*** −4.635*** 
  (0.187) (0.192) (0.206) 
 Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 N 10,169 10,172 10,172 
 peusdo R-sq 0.065 0.056 0.060  
 P-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Panel B Marginal Effect 0.044*** 0.016*** 0.034*** 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors; * = p<0.1; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01 
 
Table 5 Innofund award and TFP of firms   
 
 Panel A: Innofund dummy effects Panel B: Innofund monetary effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
  TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
InnoAft 0.104*** 0.094*** 0.078***    
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)    
InnoAmt    0.000131*** 0.000119*** 0.0000967*** 
    (0.0000278) (0.0000288) (0.0000285) 
Firm_age 0.161*** 0.184*** 0.078*** 0.161*** 0.185*** 0.078*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr −0.140*** −0.166*** −0.157*** −0.141*** −0.167*** −0.157*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt −0.225*** −0.213*** −0.199*** −0.226*** −0.213*** −0.199*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Firm_size −0.006 −0.039** −0.040** −0.005 −0.039** −0.039** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constants 0.209*** 2.673*** 2.145*** 0.205*** 2.670*** 2.142*** 
 (0.079) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.081) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 76,460 76,485 76,485 76,460 76,485 76,485 
adj. R-sq 0.031 0.020 0.043 0.030 0.020 0.043 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table 6 Innofund award and TFP of firms (PSM sample) 
Panel A: Comparison of Means across Matched Samples in Year t – 1 
 Innofund-backed firms  
(Observation=  2492) 
Non-Innofund-backed firms  
(Observation= 12330) 
Difference  
TFP_OLS      0.406 0.427 -.021 
TFP_OP1 2.726 2.728 -.002 
TFP_OP2 2.522 2.551 -.029* 
Sales  64361.87 63415.45 946.42 
Patent Stock 0.778 0.615 0.163 
ROA 0.082 0.078 0.004 
Newproduct_Rt 0.190 0.043 0.147*** 
Panel B Treatment effect (PSM sample)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 
InnoAft 0.093*** 0.104*** 0.059*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Firm_age 0.206*** 0.200*** 0.123*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
State_Shr -0.112*** -0.127*** -0.161*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Lvg_rt -0.159*** -0.132*** -0.127*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Firm_size -0.051*** -0.082*** -0.089*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Constants 0.441*** 2.985*** 2.208*** 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.087) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 82916 82939 82939 
adj. R-sq 0.036 0.025 0.059 
 





Table 7 Two-stage regressions for TFP of firms  
 (1) (2) (3) 
1st stage InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft 
Fixassets  0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constants -8.445 -8.442 -8.442 
 (92.904) (92.906) (92.906) 
2nd stage TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
InnoAft 0.634*** 1.245*** 0.773*** 
 (0.126) (0.159) (0.130) 
Firm_age −0.061*** 0.031*** −0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
State_Shr −0.958*** −1.036*** −1.011*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.031) 
Lvg_rt −0.477*** −0.443*** −0.393*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) 
Firm_size −0.005 −0.103*** −0.173*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) 
Constants 0.769*** 3.419*** 3.142*** 
 (0.073) (0.088) (0.077) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 43357 43374 43374 
adj. R-sq 0.088 0.011 0.119 





Table 8 Innofund selection before and after 2005  
 
Panel A: Innofund selection before and after 2005: TFP and financing performance of firms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Innofund Innofund Innofund Innofund Innofund 
TFP_OLS 0.323***     
 (0.033)     
2005_Aft * TFP_OLS −0.073     
 (0.061)     
TFP_OP1  0.105***    
  (0.020)    
2005_Aft * TFP_OP1  0.004    
  (0.040)    
TFP_OP2   0.225***   
   (0.030)   
2005_Aft * TFP_OP2    0.020   
   (0.057)   
ROA    1.030***  
    (0.228)  
2005_Aft * ROA    −1.127***  
    (0.352)  
ROE     0.232*** 
     (0.064) 
2005_Aft * ROE     −0.167* 
     (0.091) 
Firm_age −0.189*** −0.204*** −0.192*** −0.180*** −0.184*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) 
State_Shr −0.046 −0.176* −0.091 −0.205** −0.199** 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) (0.089) (0.090) 
Lvg_rt −0.497*** −0.569*** −0.558*** −0.547*** −0.617*** 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.088) (0.086) 
Firm_size 0.667*** 0.655*** 0.702*** 0.552*** 0.551*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Constants −4.175*** −4.208*** −4.623*** −3.458*** −3.360*** 
 (0.188) (0.195) (0.208) (0.199) (0.195) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10169 10172 10172 10909 10897 
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.056 0.060 0.045 0.045 








Table 8 (continued)  
Panel B: Innofund selection before and after 2005: Innovation, growth and labor productivity of firms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Innofund Innofund Innofund Innofund 
Patent 0.660***    
 (0.073)    
2005_Aft * Patent  −0.204*    
 (0.118)    
Value_add_per  0.002***   
  (0.000)   
2005_Aft * Value_add_per  −0.001***   
  (0.000)   
Newproduct_Rt   1.242***  
   (0.163)  
2005_Aft * Newproduct_Rt   0.230  
   (0.245)  
Growth    0.003 
    (0.008) 
2005_Aft * Growth    0.004 
    (0.013) 
Firm_age −0.182*** −0.197*** −0.217*** −0.250*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.042) 
State_Shr −0.245*** −0.247*** −0.213** −0.460*** 
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.094) (0.109) 
Lvg_rt −0.595*** −0.594*** −0.584*** −0.549*** 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.096) (0.106) 
Firm_size 0.501*** 0.665*** 0.503*** 0.658*** 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.039) (0.040) 
Constants −3.161*** −4.096*** −3.178*** −3.458*** 
 (0.195) (0.179) (0.216) (0.317) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N 10909 10810 8722 7343 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.056 0.064 0.057 






Table 9  Innofund ex-post effects before and after 2005   
  (1) (2) (3) 
  TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Panel A    
Inno_2005Bfr 0.064*** 0.050* 0.044* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Inno_2005Aft 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.131*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Firm_age 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.077*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr −0.140*** −0.166*** −0.157*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt −0.225*** −0.213*** −0.199*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Firm_size −0.005 −0.039** −0.040** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constants 0.486*** 2.884*** 2.217*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 76,460 76,485 76,485 
adj. R-sq 0.031 0.021 0.043 
Panel B       
Inno_2005Aft - Inno_2005Bfr 0.103*** 0.112*** 0.087** 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 





Table 10 Recognition of private property rights and Innofund effects before and after 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TFP_ols TFP_op1 TFP_op2 
Inno_2005Bfr 0.064*** 0.050* 0.045* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Inno_2005Aft 0.175*** 0.168*** 0.138*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Inno_2005Aft* State_Shr −0.315 −0.244 −0.265 
 (0.213) (0.222) (0.218) 
Firm_age 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.077*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr −0.137*** −0.164*** −0.155*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt −0.225*** −0.213*** −0.199*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Firm_size −0.005 −0.039** −0.040** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constants 0.486*** 2.884*** 2.217*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 76460 76485 76485 
adj. R-sq 0.031 0.021 0.043 





Table 11 Implementation of Innofund policy change and Innofund effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 
Inno_Aft 0.070*** 0.054** 0.046** 0.057** 0.043* 0.037 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Inno_2005Aft*IRA_per 2.668*** 3.081*** 2.478***    
 (0.866) (0.913) (0.889)    
Inno_2005Aft*Matchingfunds    0.292*** 0.314*** 0.252*** 
    (0.079) (0.083) (0.083) 
Firm_age 0.161*** 0.184*** 0.078*** 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.077*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr −0.140*** −0.166*** −0.157*** −0.140*** −0.166*** −0.157*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt −0.225*** −0.212*** −0.199*** −0.225*** −0.213*** −0.199*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Firm_size −0.005 −0.039** −0.040** −0.005 −0.039** −0.040** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant  0.487*** 2.884*** 2.217*** 0.484*** 2.882*** 2.216*** 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 76460 76485 76485 76460 76485 76485 
adj. R-sq 0.031 0.021 0.043 0.031 0.021 0.043 
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Appendix A.  Estimation of firm TFP 
TFP is accurately measured using three methods to ensure that the conclusions of this study are 
not driven by a specific TFP measure. 
 
In the first method, we follow Olley and Pakes (1996), who use investment as a proxy for the 
unobservable production shocks. This semi-parametric method is applied to control for the 
simultaneity caused by unobserved productivity and the non-random sample selection induced 
by the different probabilities of exits for small and large low-productivity firms. The second 
measure is based on the Törnqvist index number. The TFP measurement in this methodology is 
more flexible because no unique regression model is built. The changing-weight indices of inputs 
and outputs are applied at the firm-specific level, and TFP is represented by the residual. Index 
theorist Diewert (1992) proves the efficiency of the Törnqvist TFP index through several 
statistical tests and refers to it as a superlative index. Moreover, this study addresses the 
transitivity problem of the TFP index by establishing a common standard for TFP comparison. 
The third measure is a straightforward OLS residual from a log-linear transformation of a general 
Cobb–Douglas production function. The OLS production function estimates may have bias when 
unobservable shocks have a correlation with input levels. In addition, the OLS method lacks 
dynamic consideration. 
 
OLS Method Explanation 
The OLS method is straightforward. In the OLS regression, the TFP, which denotes the effects in 
the total output that are not caused by the tangible inputs in the production and represents the 
technological dynamism, is estimated as the error term. 
 
The equation below demonstrates the estimation of TFP through the OLS method. 
Y = A × Kα  ×  Lβ 
→  lnY = lnA +  αlnK +  βlnL. 
As the residual of the OLS regression, lnA is the TFP that we intend to measure. The firm-level 
TFP estimation is performed by considering the year and two-digit SIC code effects. The 
robustness of the estimation results are verified by relaxing the year effect to obtain the accurate 
estimation. 
 
The disadvantage of the OLS method is that it only considers tangible inputs, such as labor and 
capital, and not unobservable shocks. This aspect results in a static model, in which all types of 
inputs are exogenous and have no correlation with the error term (i.e., TFP). The limitation of the 
OLS method is obvious, and the associated coefficients are biased. 
 
OP Method Explanation 
In the presence of selection bias and simultaneity, the OP estimation allows for the endogeneity 
of some of the input factors and unobserved productivity differences among firms. Such 
estimation also considers the exit of firms from the market. Hence, the OP estimation has several 
advantages over the simple OLS method. 
 




the firm constantly maximizes the expected discounted value of future profits. Thus, stay-or-quit 
and investment decisions in each time period are formulated. 
For estimation purposes, this study uses the Cobb–Douglas production function. In particular, 
two forms, namely, gross output and value-added production functions, are adopted. The 
equations below denote the two production functions in the OP method. 
Total Outputit =  β0 +  β1Lit +  β2Kit +  β3Iit + wit +  εit 
Value Addedit =  β0 +  β1Lit + β2Kit +  wit +  εit, 
 
where Total Output/ValueAddedit is deflated by the producer price index for manufactured 
products, Lit is the labor input by firm 𝑖 at time 𝐼 (either the number of employees or the total 
payment of employees of a firm can be a proxy for this variable), Kit is the capital input by firm 𝑖 
at time 𝐼  and is deflated by the price index of investment in fixed assets,  Iit  denotes the 
intermediate inputs by firm 𝑖 at time 𝐼 and is deflated by the producer price index for purchasing 
products, wit is the productivity shock known by a firm when it makes its liquidation decision 
and investment decision, and εit is the true error term. 
 
In this study, all variables in the equations are in their logarithm form, and the time trend and 
two-digit industry heteroskedasticity are controlled. 
 
Index Method Explanation 
The index method is regarded as a mainstream method in TFP estimation. 
In this study, the case of N-input and M-output production process is initially considered. In such 
a case, Paasche, Laspeyres, or Fisher price index number formula results in different TFP 
estimations. 
 
A Törnqvist index is followed to perform the log-form TFP estimation of this study. The index 
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where 𝐵𝑖𝑠/𝐵𝑖𝑖 is the 𝑖𝑖� output revenue share in time 𝑠/𝐼, 𝑠𝑗𝑠/𝑠𝑗𝑖 is the 𝑗𝑖� input cost share in time 
𝑠/𝐼, 𝑞𝑖𝑠/𝑞𝑖𝑖 is the 𝑖𝑖� output quantity in time 
𝑠
𝑖
, and 𝑥𝑗𝑠/𝑥𝑗𝑖 is the 𝑗𝑖� input quantity in time 𝑠/𝐼. 
 
This index measures TFP change in time t as compared with time s, allowing a binary 
comparison between the two time periods. When multilateral productivity comparisons are 
involved, the abovementioned formula is updated, and the transitive Törnqvist TFP index is used 
to ensure that the circularity test is passed. 
 
Data source 
The firm-level data of this study, together with associated financial information, are derived from 
the Chinese Manufacturing Firm Survey Database (CMFSD). CMFSD is composed of virtually 
all the manufacturing firms in China with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB between 1996 




inputs, as well as other firm-specific characteristics such as location, industry, and age. The 
database is an unbalanced panel data with gaps. 
 
As a prerequisite to TFP calculation, real capital stock stimulates discussion and dispute. The 
lack of firm-level capital stock data causes difficulty in constructing the series of real capital 
stocks, which are comparable across time and firms. In this study, the perpetual inventory 
method (PIM) is applied. Through the PIM method, the effective capital stock in production is 
measured as a weighted sum of previous fixed asset investment in constant price terms. 
 
RCSt =  ∑ dτIt−τ∞τ=0 , 
 
where RCSt is real capital stock in t, dτ is the efficiency of fixed asset in τth year, and It−τ is the 
fixed asset investment flow τ years ago. 
 
With the additional assumption of dτ declining in a geometric pattern, the PIM equation can be 
written as follows: 
dτ =  (1 −  δ)τ 
RCSt =  RCSt−1 +  It −  δRCSt−1. 
 
This study formulates fixed asset growth at the two-digit SIC code level as a recursive step back 
to the year when a firm was established. Applying the preceding PIM method, together with the 
series of investment deflators from China Urban Life and Price Yearbook (2009), this study 
constructs the series of real capital stocks. 1978 is set as the starting point of the initial capital 
stock for the series calculation, and 9% is applied as the fixed depreciation rate to be specific. All 
the nominal values are deflated by price indices with benchmark 100 set in 1996. 
 
In the OP model, the decision-making process of a firm, that is, whether or not a firm opts to 
remain in the market, must be clarified. However, this information is not contained in the dataset 
used by this study. Accordingly, the panel data themselves are used to verify this exit variable. 
Using the unbalanced panel data with gaps ranging from 1996 to 2007, this study defines that the 
firm exits from the market when the observation record of a firm is continuous. However, the last 
observation is not in 2007. The dummy variable exit is equal to 1 if the firm exited from the 




Appendix B. Additional estimations  
Table B-1 Balancing tests for PSM: firm size and ROA  
 Panel A Balancing tests for firm size (total sales RMB 10,000)   
Innoyear Innofund-backed firms Non-Innofund-
backed firms 
(random) 
Difference  Non-Innofund-backed  
firms (PSM) 
Difference 
1999 66155.95 44676.73 21479.22*** 61056.98 5098.97 
2000 66952.75 36065.01 30887.74*** 76600.31 -9647.56 
2001 61495.18 38855.8 22639.38*** 63881.26 -2386.08 
2002 53562.03 43823.66 9738.37*** 50510.11 3051.92 
2003 68875.69 47416.25 21459.44*** 78049.79 -9174.1 
2004 74124.11 38213.08 35911.03*** 70022.84 4101.27 
2005 69290.54 40008.5 29282.04*** 69751.2 -460.66 
2006 54896.6 41222.16 13674.44*** 45708.39 9188.21 
2007 59151.92 40482.98 18668.94* 56483.04 2668.88 
Panel B Balancing tests for firm ROA   
Innoyear Innofund-backed firms Non-Innofund-
backed firms 
(random) 
Difference  Non-Innofund-backed  
firms (PSM) 
Difference 
1999 0.063 0.046 0.017*** 0.064 -0.001 
2000 0.068 0.054 0.014** 0.063 0.005 
2001 0.084 0.049 0.035*** 0.089 -0.005 
2002 0.071 0.057 0.014*** 0.062 0.009 
2003 0.073 0.057 0.016*** 0.069 0.004 
2004 0.095 0.060 0.035*** 0.099 -0.004 
2005 0.082 0.067 0.015* 0.075 0.007 
2006 0.088 0.073 0.015* 0.084 0.004 
2007 0.096 0.071 0.025*** 0.086 0.01 





Table B-2 Innofund and firm productivity (subsample: R&D expenditure is controlled in 
PSM)   
 
Panel A: Comparison of Means across Matched Samples in Year t – 1 
 Innofund-backed firms  
(Observation=1103) 
Non-Innofund-backed firms  
(Observation= 5406) 
Difference  
TFP_OLS      0.235 0.211 0.024 
TFP_OP1 2.599 2.552 0.047 
TFP_OP2 2.678 2.644 0.034 
Sales 62050.19 66387.24 -4337.05 
Patent Stock 1.132 1.392 -0.26 
ROA 0.088 0.093 -0.005 
Newproduct_Rt 0.186 0.113 0.073*** 
Ln(R&D expenditure) 3.26 3.301 -0.041 
Panel B Treatment effect (PSM sample)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 
InnoAft 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.033* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Firm_age 0.170*** 0.184*** 0.083*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
State_Shr -0.100*** -0.134*** -0.116*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Lvg_rt -0.186*** -0.163*** -0.134*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Firm_size -0.071*** -0.116*** -0.125*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constants 0.647*** 3.117*** 2.411*** 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.098) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 43607 43612 43612 
adj. R-sq 0.026 0.022 0.072 
 







Table B-3 Robustness checks for time window around 2005 break  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 
Inno_2004Bfr 0.080*** 0.072** 0.069**    
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)    
Inno_2004 0.075 0.051 0.057    
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.058)    
Inno_2005Bfr    0.075*** 0.061** 0.057** 
    (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Inno_2006Aft    0.095** 0.089** 0.056 
    (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Firm_age 0.097*** 0.131*** 0.017 0.151*** 0.178*** 0.069*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
State_Shr −0.127*** −0.154*** −0.134*** −0.124*** −0.154*** −0.139*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Lvg_rt −0.241*** −0.232*** −0.222*** −0.230*** −0.218*** −0.204*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Firm_size 0.034 −0.000 −0.002 0.009 −0.024 −0.024 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constants 0.354*** 2.774*** 2.094*** 0.440*** 2.842*** 2.167*** 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.120) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 47599 47607 47607 63586 63595 63595 
adj. R-sq 0.038 0.023 0.036 0.034 0.022 0.040 





Table B-4 Robustness check for the effects of decentralization of Innofund governance in 2005 and 
the time length of the panel  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TFP_OLS TFP_OP1 TFP_OP2 
Inno_2005Bfr(1/3) 0.081*** 0.062** 0.059** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Inno_2005Bfr(4/8) -0.000 0.003 -0.011 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
Inno_2005Aft 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.126*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Firm_age 0.158*** 0.182*** 0.075*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
State_Shr -0.140*** -0.166*** -0.157*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Lvg_rt -0.226*** -0.213*** -0.199*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Firm_size -0.004 -0.038** -0.039** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constants 0.482*** 2.881*** 2.213*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 76460 76485 76485 
adj. R-sq 0.031 0.021 0.043 
Lincom Test    
Inno_2005Aft-Inno_2005Bfr(1/3) 0.081** 0.095** 0.067* 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors; * = p<0.1; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. 
 
 
 
